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ABSTRACT. This study was motivated by the problem of identifying fake documents on the
Internet. To explore possible solutions to this problem we introduce a model of a network community
in which members submit documents with verifiable content. Documents are evaluated by three
individuals, randomly selected from all the members. The members whose documents are evaluated
as authentic gain reputation. Otherwise, they lose it. Members with higher reputation have a greater
chance to be selected to serve as evaluators. Analytical and computational results suggest this
evaluation mechanism is effective in a wide range of parameters including the presence of members
who consistently submit fake content and do not evaluate documents of others objectively. The
proposed mechanism can be used in a variety of situations including evaluating photo and video files
with geolocation and time data and creating collections of digital evidence of events clear from fake
materials.
AMS (MOS) Subject Classification. 91B74.
1. Introduction
The Internet is swamped with unverified and fake information. Distribution of
such documents is widely used in politics and commerce [1–3]. Known approaches
to verification of information have limited efficiency. Fact checking sites such as
FactCheck.org and Snopes.com have limited capabilities to counter-balance the influx
of fake materials. The throughput of these sites is constrained by available resources,
particularly by the number of people working for them. In addition, the credibility
of such cites is questioned since closed groups of people, involved in verification,
may develop bias [4]. An attractive alternative could be a decentralized, distributed
mechanism of verification. Here we define and explore the viability of a model of a
network community of members with such a mechanism.
The proposed verification process is inspired by academia peer-reviewing. The
following principles of academic reviewing have been borrowed: blind evaluation by
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2 A. OLIFER
several independent reviewers and the selection of reviewers according to their rep-
utation. The reviewers are independent in a sense that they do not communicate
with each other or anybody else. The reviewing is blind – reviewers do not know the
author of the reviewed document. The selection according to reputation means that
the community members with a greater reputation have a greater probability of be-
ing selected. However, the reviewing process modeled here is simpler than academic
peer-reviewing in a few respects: 1) evaluation results are binary – documents are
evaluated as either authentic or fake; 2) the evaluation process is not hierarchical –
each of three reviewers votes pro or contra and the decision is determined by a simple
majority; 3) evaluators do not deal with rebuttals and resubmissions.
Modeling of reputations is the core of the proposed model. There are many
computational models of reputation and trust that vary in how individuals interact
and use the results of interactions; see for example review [5]. Particular attention
has been placed on peer-to-peer interactions in the context of on-line commerce as
in eBay and Amazon [6–9]. The model considered in this study is different from
these works. Most importantly, the model describes the time evolution of proportions
of individuals with certain levels of reputation. It does not take into account the
reputations of specific individuals. Similar mechanisms of reputation changes have
been considered earlier [8], but as far as we know, not in population models. The
population model approach allows us to explore the behavior of large communities.
In traditional agent-based simulations the size of model communities is limited.
The main question of the study was whether a community with the specified rules
could function in such a way that the authenticity of most of the documents submitted
by its members were evaluated correctly. Here, we started the exploration of the
community’s model assuming simple, if not the simplest, choices for the parameters
that could be set by community developers. We show that for those choices, under
some assumptions regarding members’ behavior, the answer is affirmative.
The model and approach are introduced in Section 2. In that section, a simple
case of a community without cliques and members with only three possible values
of reputation is considered. Section 3 describes a generalization of the model to a
case with an arbitrary number of reputation values. Results of computer simulations
of the model with eleven possible values of reputation are presented in Section 4.
Subsequent Sections 5 and 6 explore modeled communities with one and then two
cliques respectively; in the latter case, the cliques are antagonistic to each other. The
paper ends with a discussion (Section 7) and conclusions (Section 8).
Computer simulations were performed in Matlab (MathWorks, Natick, MA) using
ode45 function with the absolute and relative tolerances equal to 10−7 on a PC with
a 2.3 GHz processor and 16 Gb memory.
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2. Communities with three levels of reputation
1. Notations and equations. In this section, for simplicity of exposition, the
reputation of the community members has only three values, r0, r1, r2, where 0 ≤ r0 <
r1 < r2 ≤ 1. The values of rk are sometimes expressed as percentages. For example,
rk = 1 corresponds to 100% reputation. The proportion of the community members
with the reputation rk is denoted by Rk, 0 ≤ Rk ≤ 1, k = 0, 1, 2; R0 + R1 + R2 =
1. Equivalently, Rk is the probability of randomly selecting a member with the
reputation rk. Together, Rk define a probability distribution. It is assumed that
new members start with one and the same value of reputation. Appearance of new
members and loss of existing members of the community can be modeled by changes
in the corresponding values of Rk. For example, if there is an influx of new members
with the reputation r1 then the distribution of Rk should change to reflect the increase
of R1. However, in this study we assume that the number of the community members
is fixed.
After the document, submitted by a member, is evaluated, the member’s reputa-
tion changes. It increases or remains maximal (equal to r2) if the document is evalu-
ated as authentic. Otherwise the reputation decreases or remains minimal (equal to
r0). All the members submit documents with the same rate. These assumptions lead
to the equations
dR0
dt
= −R0e0︸ ︷︷ ︸
increase
reputation
+R1(1− e1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
decrease
reputation
dR1
dt
= R0e0 −R1e1︸ ︷︷ ︸
increase
reputation
+R2(1− e2)−R1(1− e1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
decrease
reputation
dR2
dt
= R1e1︸︷︷︸
increase
reputation
−R2(1− e2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
decrease
reputation
,
(2.1)
where t is time, and ek, 0 ≤ ek ≤ 1, is the probability that a document, submitted
by a member with the reputation rk, is evaluated as authentic during a unit of time.
The following proposition shows that (2.1) indeed describes an evolution of a
probability distribution {R0, R1, R2}.
Proposition 2.1. Let the initial values Rk(0) of Rk be such that R0(0) + R1(0) +
R2(0) = 1 and 0 ≤ Rk(0) ≤ 1. Then a) R0(t)+R1(t)+R2(t) ≡ 1, and b) 0 ≤ Rk(t) ≤
1 for all t.
Proof. Summing up the equations yields d(R0 + R1 + R2)/dt ≡ 0. Hence at any
moment of time, as at t = 0, the sum of Rk is equal to one which proves a). Part b)
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follows from the fact that according to (2.1) once Rk becomes equal to 0 it can no
longer decrease and once it becomes equal to 1 it can no longer increase. Indeed, let
for example, R0(t) = 0 for some t, while 0 < R1(t) < 1 and 0 < R2(t) < 1. Then the
right hand side of the first equation in (2.1) is non-negative, or dR0(t)/dt ≥ 0. On
the other hand, if R0(t) = 1 for some t then it implies R1(t) = 0 and the right hand
side of the equation for dR0/dt is non-positive, or dR0(t)/dt ≤ 0. The cases of R1
and R2 are similar.
To specify system (2.1) completely we need to define the probabilities ek. This
takes several steps. The probability sk of selecting a member with a reputation rk to
serve as a reviewer is set to be proportional to the member’s reputation rk:
sk =
rkRk
r0R0 + r1R1 + r2R2
, k = 0, 1, 2. (2.2)
For r0 = 0 the formula gives s0 = 0 meaning that the members with zero reputa-
tion are never selected to be evaluators. Function s0(R0, R1, R2) has a discontinuity
at R0 = 1, R1 = 0, R2 = 0. We remove it by setting s0 = 0 at this point.
Let pc,ind be the probability that a randomly selected evaluator correctly evaluates
documents, and let a member with a reputation rk correctly evaluate documents with
a probability ck. Since a selected reviewer can have one of the three reputations,
pc,ind = s0c0 + s1c1 + s2c2. (2.3)
In this and the other models considered in this study whether the document is
authentic or fake is independently decided by three reviewers. As with the choice of
the values of rk we wanted to start the exploration of the model with a simple case.
Three reviewers is the smallest number of reviewers who could make a decision by
the majority without a tie.
The probability that the document is correctly evaluated by the majority of
reviewers is
pc = p
3
c,ind + 3p
2
c,ind(1− pc,ind). (2.4)
The first term is the probability that all three evaluators correctly evaluate the
document. The second term is the probability that one of the evaluators makes a
mistake.
The probabilities ek, that the documents submitted by the members with repu-
tation rk are evaluated as authentic, are sums of two probabilities. One is a product
of the probability ak that the document submitted by a member with reputation rk is
authentic and the probability pc that it is correctly evaluated as authentic. The other
probability is the product of the probability 1 − ak that the submitted document is
fake and the probability 1− pc that it is incorrectly evaluated as authentic:
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ek = akpc + (1− ak)(1− pc), k = 0, 1, 2. (2.5)
Let the probabilities ak in (2.5) and ck in (2.3) be determined by functions of the
members’ reputation a = a(r) and c = c(r) and that ak = a(rk) and ck = c(rk). We
assume that the probabilities of submitting authentic documents, a(r), and correctly
evaluating documents, c(r), increase with the increase of reputation. We also posit
that the members with zero reputation never submit authentic documents, a(0) = 0,
and never evaluate the documents of others correctly, c(0) = 0, while the members
with 100% reputation always submit authentic documents, a(1) = 1, and always
evaluate the documents of others correctly, c(1) = 1. Let a(r) and c(r) be at most
quadratic functions of r. It can be directly verified that to satisfy the assumptions
above they have to have the following form:
a(r) = r(1 + α(1− r)), −1 ≤ α ≤ 1,
c(r) = r(1 + σ(1− r)), −1 ≤ σ ≤ 1.
(2.6)
When parameters α and σ are positive, the functions a(r) and c(r) are concave
(Fig.1). In this case the probabilities of submitting authentic documents and correct
document evaluation exceed the reputations of the members. When α and σ are
negative the functions a(r) and c(r) are convex and the probabilities of submitting
authentic documents and correct document evaluation are less than the reputations
of the members. (In the future studies it would be interesting to explore a model
with more general assumptions a(0), c(0) ≥ 0 and a(1), c(1) ≤ 1).
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 10
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
x
y
á =1
-á = 1
Figure 1. Function f(x) = x(1 + α(1 − x)) used in (2.6). The line
y = x corresponds to α = 0. The two other unlabeled curves correspond
to the α = 0.5 and α = −0.5.
System (2.1) is completely defined now. It is a non-linear system with five pa-
rameters: r0, r1, r2, α and σ. Unless mentioned otherwise r0 = 0, r1 = 0.5, r2 = 1.
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We chose these values for two reasons. They simplify analysis, and for these values
of rk the modeled system converges to a state at which all documents are evaluated
correctly; see Proposition 2.2 below.
2. Equilibria. System (2.1) is essentially two-dimensional since one of the variables
Rk can be excluded using the equality R0+R1+R2 ≡ 1. With the excluded R1 system
(2.1) turns into
dR0
dt
= −R0e0 + (1−R0 −R2)(1− e1)
dR2
dt
= (1−R0 −R2)e1 −R2(1− e2).
(2.7)
The Poincare´-Bendixson theorem [10] implies that the long-term behavior of sys-
tem (2.7) as a two-dimensional system, could be either an equilibrium, a limit cycle
or a homo-/heteroclinic orbit.
The vector field of system (2.7) for different values of α and σ indicates that the
system has only equilibria that are located at the line R2 = 1−R0 (Fig.2).
Proposition 2.2. The points of the line R2 = 1 − R0, R0 ∈ [0, 1], are equilibria of
system (2.7). At these points all documents are evaluated correctly, pc = 1.
Proof. For the proof we need to verify that −R0e0 + (1 − R0 − R2)(1 − e1) = 0 and
(1−R0−R2)e1−R2(1− e2) = 0. The condition R2 = 1−R0 simplifies the equations
to R0e0 = 0 and R2(1 − e2) = 0. The condition also implies R1 = 0. It is directly
verifiable that (2.2)-(2.6) yield pc = 1, a0 = 0, a2 = 1, and then e0 = 0 and e2 = 1,
which proves the proposition.
In fact the proof holds for all the functions a(r) and c(r) such that a(0) = 0
and a(1) = c(1) = 1. The condition a(0) = 0 implies that the members with zero
reputation submit only fake documents. The condition a(1) = c(1) = 1 implies that
the members with 100% reputation submit only authentic documents and make no
mistakes in evaluation.
The reasons why the states (R0, 1 − R0) are equilibria are quite intuitive. At
equilibrium, the evaluators are chosen only from the members with 100% reputation
who make no mistakes. Hence the members with zero reputation, who submit only
fake documents, have no chance to increase their reputation, while the members with
100% reputation, who submit only authentic documents, never loose it. It is not the
case when there exist members whose reputation is more than zero and less than
one. Such members can be selected to evaluate and can make mistakes in evaluation.
Because of such mistakes, members with zero reputation can increase it and members
with 100% reputation can loose it.
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Linear stability analysis does not allow to determine the stability of the equilibria
(R0, 1−R0). When R0 < 1, the matrix of the system (2.7), linearized at (R0, 1−R0),
has the eigenvalues −1 and 0, the latter meaning a critical case [11]. Computer sim-
ulations suggest that the equilibria (R0, 1−R0), R0 ∈ [0, 1], are stable in Lyapunov’s
sense, meaning that if the system starts evolving from near an equilibrium it will
remain near the equilibrium forever [11] (cf. Fig.2).
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
R2
R0
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
R2
R0
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
á = 0
ó = 0
á = 1
ó = -1
Figure 2. The vector field of model (2.7). α = σ = 0 (left), α = 1,
σ = −1 (right).
3. Communities with multiple levels of reputation
System (2.1) can be directly generalized to the case with more than three levels
of reputation. Let rk = ∆k, ∆ = 1/L, k = 0, · · · , L. (Equally spaced values of rk are
defined by just one parameter, L. This is important at this initial stage of the study
since the model has a large number of other parameters. It is possible that for other
choices of rk the model performs better. This is a question for future research.) The
equations for Rk, 0 ≤ Rk ≤ 1,
∑L
k=0Rk = 1, take the form
dR0
dt
= −R0e0 +R1(1− e1)
...
dRk
dt
= Rk−1ek−1 −Rk +Rk+1(1− ek+1), k = 1, · · · , L− 1,
...
dRL
dt
= RL−1eL−1 −RL(1− eL).
(3.1)
Definitions (2.5)-(2.6) are generalized in a straightforward way. As in the case of
system (2.7), system (3.1) has two parameters: α and σ.
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System (3.1) has a similar set of equilibria as system 2.7 for the community with
three levels of reputation.
Proposition 3.1. The points of the line (R0, 0, · · · , 0, 1− R0), R0 ∈ [0, 1], are equi-
libria of system (3.1). At these points all documents are evaluated correctly, pc = 1.
Proof. For the proof we need to verify that on the line (R0, 0, · · · , 0, 1 − R0) all the
right-hand sides of (3.1) are equal to zero. This is trivially true for all the equations
but the first one, R0e0 = 0, and the last one, RL(1−eL) = 0. For these two equations
the reasoning is the same as in the proof of Proposition 2.2.
The numerical results presented in the next section suggest that as in the case
of system (2.7) these equilibria are stable in Lyapunov’s sense for all α, σ ∈ [−1, 1].
However they are not globally stable at least for some values of α and σ.
4. Computer simulations
In what follows L = 10 and rk = 0.1k, k = 0, · · · , 10. Since the dynamical system
is ten–dimensional (only ten independent Rks) the Poincare´-Bendixson theorem is not
applicable. Figure 3 shows the dynamics of the system, typical for the majority of the
initial values and values of α and σ. Two ‘forces’ pull Rks in the opposite directions
– the members either gain reputation until it reaches the maximal value of 100%, or
loose reputation until it reaches its minimal value of 0%. The most common initial
condition considered is supposed to model the ‘birth’ of the community, when it
consists of new members only, and every new member has the same initial reputation
that we set to be 60%.
The dynamics of system (3.1) is more complex compared to system (2.1). For
α and σ near α = 1, σ = −1 the system shows bi-stability – the equilibrium state
depends on initial values of Rk. The existence of an equilibrium different from those
described in Proposition 3.1 is shown in Figure 4. The initial conditions are the same
as in the case of Fig.3 but α = 1, σ = −1. As the figure shows, the ‘force’ that makes
members of the community lose their reputation dominates and the equilibrium is at-
tained with the majority of the members having low reputations; the most numerous
category of the members have the reputation equal to 30%. At that equilibrium state
pc = 0.07 meaning evaluators are almost always wrong. However, with the initial
values Rk = 0, k 6= 7, and R7 = 1, the system converges to a bimodal distribution
(0.0425, 0, · · · , 0, 0.9575) with pc = 1 (not shown). The probability of correct docu-
ment evaluation pc at the equilibrium states of system (3.1) and various values of α
and σ is shown in Fig.5. For all the values of α and σ initial values are the same as
in Figures 3 and 4.
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Figure 3. Evolution of the model with eleven levels of reputation to
a bimodal distribution. Rk are the proportions of the members with
reputations rk = 0.1k, k = 0, · · · , 10. Initially, at t = 0, R6 = 1, while
all the other Rk = 0. Over time, all the members attain either zero
(k = 0) or 100% (k = 10) reputation, and the probability of correct
document evaluation pc approaches one. α = σ = 0.
Computations show that whether and how the system exhibits bi-stability de-
pends on the dimension of the system, and parameters α and σ. In these com-
putations, all the members had initial reputation equal to 0.6. In the case of the
5–dimensional system with the reputation values r = (0, 0.2, · · · , 1) the system be-
haves as in Fig.3 and converges to an equilibrium state with pc=1. In the case of
the 20–dimensional system with the reputation values r = (0, 0.05, · · · , 1) the system
behaves as in Fig.4 and converges to an equilibrium state with pc = 0.04. Making
all initial reputations in the 20–dimensional system equal to 0.65 does not change
the behavior quantitatively. However, the equilibrium state changes drastically when
all initial reputations are set to 0.7. Then the system behaves as in Fig.3 with an
equilibrium state at which pc = 1.
In summary, simulations suggest that in the absence of cliques the behavior of
the modeled community evolves to one of two stable steady states. In one state, all
the members have either 100% reputation or zero reputation; see example in Fig.3.
In this state, all the documents are evaluated correctly for a majority of the values of
α and σ that specify functions a(r) and c(r) (2.6). In the other state, the majority of
community members have low reputations; see example in Fig. 4. In this state, the
documents are rarely evaluated correctly. The system evolves to one state or another
depending on initial conditions which in turn depend on the dimension of the system.
Detailed analysis of this bi-stability was beyond the scope of the present study.
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Figure 4. Evolution of the model with eleven levels of reputation to
a unimodal distribution. Rk are the proportions of the members with
reputations rk = 0.1k, k = 0, · · · , 10. At t = 0, R6 = 1 while all
the other Rk = 0. At the equilibrium, most of the members have low
reputations. The members in the most numerous category have repu-
tation 30% (k = 3). At this state the probability of correct document
evaluation pc = 0.07. α = 1, σ = −1.
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Figure 5. Probability of correct document evaluation pc in the model
of a community without cliques is equal to one for most values of pa-
rameters α and σ. At t = 0, R6 = 1 while all the other Rk = 0.
5. Community with a clique
In real life there are groups of agents with agendas. For those groups their
agendas are the only thing that matters. Groups of this kind are called cliques here.
Consider a system with one clique. Let fcl be the fraction of clique members in the
community. The remaining 1 − fcl fraction are ‘regular’ members. We extend the
system with regular members, considered in the previous section, by adding L + 1
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Table 1. Probabilities of submitting various types of documents by
regular and clique members with reputations rk, k = 0, · · · , L.
Document type Regular members Clique members
Generic, authentic (1− 2pλ)ak 0
Generic, fake (1− 2pλ)(1− ak) 0
Clique, authentic pλak γak
Clique, fake pλ(1− ak) 1− γak
Anti-clique, authentic pλak 0
Anti-clique, fake pλ(1− ak) 0
phase variables Qk, k = 0, · · · , L, 0 ≤ Qk ≤ 1, for the proportions of the clique
members with reputations rk, Q0 +Q1 + · · ·+QL = fcl.
Table 1 defines the probabilities of submitting documents of various types by
regular and clique members. Parameter pλ stands for the probability that a docu-
ment submitted by a regular member supports the clique’s views. For simplicity, the
probability that a document submitted by a regular member contradicts the clique’s
views is set to pλ as well. The probability that a document has nothing to do with
the clique’s agenda is 1− 2pλ. Clique members submit only the documents that sup-
port the clique’s view. Parameter γ, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, determines to what extent clique
members are able to submit authentic documents in accord with their reputation;
for small values of γ, even highly reputable clique members submit mostly fake doc-
uments. Probabilities ak of submitting authentic documents by the members with
reputation rk are defined by (2.6).
Table 2 defines the probabilities of correct evaluation of particular documents
by regular and clique members. The probabilities ck of correct document evaluation
by the members with reputations rk are defined by (2.6). In contrast to regular
members, who evaluate all the documents in the same way, clique members evaluate
documents differently depending whether the documents support the clique’s views
or not. We assume they evaluate generic documents by flipping a coin because they
do not care about such documents. All the documents that support the clique’s views
are evaluated as authentic. All the documents that contradict the clique’s views are
evaluated as fake.
The differential equations for Qk are similar for those for Rk:
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Table 2. Probabilities of correct document evaluation by regular and
clique members with reputations rk, k = 0, · · · , L.
Document type Regular members Clique members
Generic, authentic ck 0.5
Generic, fake ck 0.5
Clique, authentic ck 1
Clique, fake ck 0
Anti-clique, authentic ck 0
Anti-clique, fake ck 1
dR0
dt
= −R0e(reg)0 +R1(1− e(reg)1 )
...
dRk
dt
= Rk−1e
(reg)
k−1 −Rk +Rk+1(1− e(reg)k+1 ), k = 1, · · · , L− 1,
...
dRL
dt
= RL−1e
(reg)
L−1 −RL(1− e(reg)L )
dQ0
dt
= −Q0e(cl)0 +Q1(1− e(cl)1 )
...
dQk
dt
= Qk−1e
(cl)
k−1 −Qk +Qk+1(1− e(cl)k+1), k = 1, · · · , L− 1,
...
dQL
dt
= QL−1e
(cl)
L−1 −QL(1− e(cl)L ).
(5.1)
In (5.1), e
(reg)
k , 0 ≤ k ≤ L, stand for the probability that the documents submitted
by the regular members with the reputation rk are evaluated as authentic. Similarly,
e
(cl)
k , 0 ≤ k ≤ L, stand for the probabilities that the documents, submitted by clique
members with the reputation rk, are evaluated as authentic. As in (2.1) and (3.1) the
summation of all the equations in (5.1) shows that the sum of all Rk does not change
over time and is always equal to 1− fcl, and the sum of all Qk does not change over
time, and is always equal to fcl.
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In the model of a community without cliques, the probability ek of evaluating
documents as authentic is equal to the sum of the probabilities that authentic and fake
documents submitted by the members with reputation rk are evaluated as authentic.
In the model with a clique we consider authentic and fake documents of three possible
types: those that have nothing to do with the clique’s agenda (‘Generic’ or ‘g’), those
that support the clique’s views (‘Clique’ or ‘q’), and those that contradict the clique’s
views (‘Anti-clique’ or ‘q¯’). Each of these three types of documents can be authentic
(‘A’) or fake (‘F’). Table 1 defines the probability of evaluating a document of each
category as authentic. Following the table we obtain for regular agents
e
(reg)
k = (1− 2pλ)akpc(g, A) + (1− 2pλ)(1− ak)pm(g, F )
+ pλakpc(q, A) + pλ(1− ak)pm(q, F )
+ pλakpc(q¯, A) + pλ(1− ak)pm(q¯, F ), k = 0, · · · , L.
(5.2)
Every term is a product of three probabilities. In the first term, these are the
probabilities that the document is generic/authentic/correctly evaluated as authentic:
1 − 2pλ/ak/pc(g, A). In the second term, these are the probabilities that the docu-
ment is generic/fake/mistakenly evaluated as authentic: 1− 2pλ/1− ak/pm(g, F ). In
the third term, these are the probabilities that the document supports the clique’s
views/authentic/correctly evaluated as authentic: pλ/ak/pc(q, A). In the fourth term,
these are the probabilities that the document supports the clique’s views/fake/mistakenly
evaluated as authentic: pλ/1−ak/pm(q, F ). In the fifth term, these are the probabili-
ties that the document contradicts the clique’s views/authentic/correctly evaluated as
authentic: pλ/ak/pc(q¯, T ). Finally, in the sixth term, these are the probabilities that
the document contradicts the clique’s views/fake/mistakenly evaluated as authentic:
pλ/1− ak/pm(q¯, F ).
Taking into account that clique members submit only documents related to clique
agenda (cf. Table 1)
e
(cl)
k = γakpc(q, A) + (1− γak)pm(q, F ), k = 0, · · · , L. (5.3)
The probability of correct evaluation, pc, and the probability of false evalua-
tion, pm, in (5.2) and (5.3) depend on the corresponding probabilities for individual
evaluators (cf. (2.4)). Namely,
pc(g, A) = p
2
c,ind(g, A)(3− 2pc,ind(g, A)), pc(g, F ) = p2c,ind(g, F )(3− 2pc,ind(g, F )),
pc(q, A) = p
2
c,ind(q, A)(3− 2pc,ind(q, A)), pc(q, F ) = p2c,ind(q, F )(3− 2pc,ind(q, F )),
pc(q¯, A) = p
2
c,ind(q¯, A)(3− 2pc,ind(q¯, A)), pc(q¯, F ) = p2c,ind(q¯, F )(3− 2pc,ind(q¯, F )),
(5.4)
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where, following (2.3) and Table 2,
pc,ind(g, A) =
L∑
k=0
s
(reg)
k ck + 0.5
L∑
k=0
s
(cl)
k , pm,ind(g, F ) =
L∑
k=0
s
(reg)
k (1− ck) + 0.5
L∑
k=0
s
(cl)
k ,
pc,ind(q, A) =
L∑
k=0
s
(reg)
k ck +
L∑
k=0
s
(cl)
k , pm,ind(q, F ) =
L∑
k=0
s
(reg)
k (1− ck) +
L∑
k=0
s
(cl)
k ,
pc,ind(q¯, A) =
L∑
k=0
s
(reg)
k ck, pm,ind(q¯, F ) =
L∑
k=0
s
(reg)
k (1− ck).
(5.5)
In (5.5), the probabilities of correct evaluation ck are defined as in (2.6).
The probability of selecting a regular member with a reputation rk is
s
(reg)
k =
rkRk∑L
i=0 ri(Ri +Qi)
, (5.6)
and, similarly, the probability of selecting a clique member with a reputation rk is
s
(cl)
k =
rkQk∑L
i=0 ri(Ri +Qi)
. (5.7)
The main characteristic of the system’s functionality is the probability pc of
correct evaluation of a document. All three types of documents have to be taken into
account: generic, ‘g’, supporting the clique’s views, ‘q’, and contradicting the clique’s
views, ‘q¯’:
pc = Prob(g, A)pc(g, A) + Prob(g, F )(1− pm(g, F ))
+ Prob(q, A)pc(q, A) + Prob(q, F )(1− pm(c, F ))
+ Prob(q¯, A)pc(q¯, A) + Prob(q¯, F )(1− pm(q¯, F )).
(5.8)
Here, the probabilities of submitted authentic, ‘A’, or fake, ‘F’, documents of
types g, q, and q¯ are
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Prob(g, A) = (1− 2pλ)
L∑
k=0
Rkak,
P rob(g, F ) = (1− 2pλ)
L∑
k=0
Rk(1− ak),
P rob(q, A) = pλ
L∑
k=0
Rkak +
L∑
k=0
Qkγak,
P rob(q, F ) = pλ
L∑
k=0
Rk(1− ak) +
L∑
k=0
Qk(1− γak),
P rob(q¯, A) = pλ
L∑
k=0
Rkak
Prob(q¯, F ) = pλ
L∑
k=0
Rk(1− ak).
(5.9)
In summary, the model of a community with a clique has three parameters,
additional to the parameters of the model (3.1) of a community without cliques: fcl,
the fraction of the clique in the community, pλ, the proportion of documents matching
the clique’s agenda, and γ, the factor that stands for decreasing the probability of
submitting authentic documents by clique members.
System (5.1), similar to (3.1), has easy-to-guess equilibria at which pc = 1.
Proposition 5.1. System (5.1) has equilibria at which RL = 1 − fcl − R0, R0 ∈
[0, 1 − fcl], Q0 = fcl, and all the other phase variables are equal to zero. At the
equilibria pc = 1.
Proof. Substitution of the equilibrium values of Rk and Qk into (5.6) and (5.7) gives
s
(reg)
L = 1 while all the other s
(reg)
k = 0 and s
(cl)
k = 0. Then (5.5) yields pc,ind(·, A) = 1
and pm,ind(·, F ) = 0. Next, (5.2) and (5.3) imply e(reg)k = ak and e(cl)k = γak, meaning
in particular, e
(reg)
L = 1 and e
(cl)
0 = 0. These values and the putative equilibrium
values of the phase variables make all the right-hand sides of (3.1) equal to zero.
Thus it is indeed an equilibrium. Similarly, it is directly verified that at the points of
equilibria pc = 1.
Figure 6 shows the dependency of the probability of correct document evaluation
pc on various γ and fcl for pλ = 0.01, α = σ = 0, and R6(0) = 1 − fcl, Q6(0) = fcl,
while all the other Rk(0) and Qk(0) are equal to zero. The figure represents the
system behavior at time t = 200, when the system is close to equilibrium.
Consider two extreme cases shown in the figure, when there is no clique, fcl = 0,
and when there are no regular members, fcl = 1. In the absence of a clique the
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Figure 6. Probability of correct document evaluation pc in the model
of a community with a clique as a function of the fraction of clique
members in the community, fcl, and the factor, decreasing the prob-
ability of submitting authentic documents by clique members, γ. At
t = 0, R6 = 1 − fcl, Q6 = fcl, while all the other Rk = 0 and Qk = 0.
Documents are evaluated correctly, pc = 1, only when the fraction of
the clique fcl is small. pλ = 0.01, α = σ = 0.
equations for a community with a clique (5.1) turn into the equations for a community
without a clique (3.1). The value of γ becomes irrelevant, and pc = 1, as in Fig. 5.
In the absence of regular members the dynamics of the system is very simple. All
documents, submitted by clique members, are evaluated by clique members only and
therefore are judged as authentic. The reputations of all the members only increase.
Eventually, all the members have the maximal reputation, rL = 1. At this point,
for all values of other parameters, Prob(c, A) = γ, pc(q, A) = 1, pm(q, F ) = 1, and
therefore pc = γ (Fig.6).
Simulations show that the system sets to the states with perfect evaluation, pc =
1, whenever the clique size fcl does not exceed 20% of the whole community and
γ ≤ 0.7. When α and σ both increase, pc = 1 for greater clique sizes (not shown).
In the simulations above, the proportion pλ of documents, submitted by regular
members and related to the clique, was small, pλ = 0.01. The equilibria with pc = 1
from proposition 5.1 should be independent of pλ according to the proposition’s proof.
Figure 7 shows this is indeed the case for α = σ = 0, and γ = 0.5. It shows also
that the states with the probability of correct document evaluation pc less than one
depend on pλ only a little.
6. Two antagonistic cliques
Cliques often form antagonistic pairs. In such a pair, the agendas of a clique and
an ‘anti–clique’ are diametrically opposite. As in the model with one clique, three
types of documents are considered: generic, ‘g’, supporting the clique’s views, ‘q’,
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Figure 7. Probability of correct document evaluation pc in the equilib-
rium states weakly depends on the proportion pλ of documents, related
to the clique’s agenda; pc = 1 when the fraction of clique members in
the community, fcl, is less than 20%. At t = 0, R6 = 1− fcl, Q6 = fcl,
while all the other Rk = 0 and Qk = 0. α = σ = 0, γ = 0.5.
and contradicting the clique’s views, ‘q¯’. The antagonism of the cliques determines
the probabilities of submission and correct evaluation of documents (Tables 3 and 4).
All the parameters in the tables play the same roles as in the model with one clique.
Table 3 defines the probabilities of submitting authentic and fake documents by
regular, clique, and anti-clique members. For example, according to the first line,
regular members with a reputation rk submit authentic generic documents with the
probability (1 − 2pλ)ak while members of the cliques never submit such documents.
The second line shows that the probability that regular members with a reputation
rk submit fake generic documents is equal to (1− 2pλ)(1− ak). Cliques members do
not submit fake generic documents, and so on.
Table 4 defines the probabilities of correct evaluation of particular documents by
regular, clique, and anti-clique members. The probabilities ck of correct evaluation of
documents by members with reputations rk are defined by (2.6). As the table shows,
it is assumed that the members of both cliques, when selected to be evaluators, don’t
care about generic documents that are not related to their agenda; they evaluate those
documents by flipping a coin. All the documents that support the position of one
clique the members of the antagonistic clique evaluate as fake. All the documents that
contradict the position of one clique the members of the antagonistic clique evaluate
as authentic.
Let Uk, k = 0, · · · , L, be the proportions of the members of the anti-clique with
reputations rk. The equations for Uk have the same form as for regular members and
members of the clique (see 3.1) since the rules of the community are the same for all
the members.
18 A. OLIFER
Table 3. Probabilities of submitting various types of documents by
regular, clique, and anti-clique members with the reputations rk, k =
0, · · · , L.
Document type Regular members Clique members Anti-clique members
Generic, authentic (1− 2pλ)ak 0 0
Generic, fake (1− 2pλ)(1− ak) 0 0
Clique, authentic pλak γak 0
Clique, fake pλ(1− ak) 1− γak 0
Anti-clique, authentic pλak 0 γak
Anti-clique, fake pλ(1− ak) 0 1− γak
Table 4. Probabilities of correct evaluation of various types of docu-
ments by regular, clique, and anti-clique members with reputation rk,
k = 0, · · · , L.
Document type Regular members Clique members Anti-clique members
Generic, authentic ck 0.5 0.5
Generic, fake ck 0.5 0.5
Clique, authentic ck 1 0
Clique, fake ck 0 1
Anti-clique, authentic ck 0 1
Anti-clique, fake ck 1 0
dR0
dt
= −R0e(reg)0 +R1(1− e(reg)1 )
...
dRk
dt
= Rk−1e
(reg)
k−1 −Rk +Rk+1(1− e(reg)k+1 ), k = 1, · · · , L− 1,
...
dRL
dt
= RL−1e
(reg)
L−1 −RL(1− e(reg)L )
dQ0
dt
= −Q0e(cl)0 +Q1(1− e(cl)1 )
...
dQk
dt
= Qk−1e
(cl)
k−1 −Qk +Qk+1(1− e(cl)k+1), k = 1, · · · , L− 1,
...
dQL
dt
= QL−1eL−1 −Q(1)L (1− e(cl)L )
dU0
dt
= −U0e(a-cl)0 + U1(1− e(a-cl)1 )
...
dUk
dt
= Uk−1e
(a-cl)
k−1 − Uk + Uk+1(1− e(a-clk+1 ), k = 1, · · · , L− 1,
...
dUL
dt
= UL−1e
(a-cl)
L−1 − UL(1− e(a-cl)L ).
(6.1)
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In (6.1), e
(reg)
k and e
(cl)
k have the same meaning as in (5.2-5.3). Similarly, e
(a-cl)
k ,
0 ≤ k ≤ L, stand for the probability that the documents, submitted by anti-clique
members with a reputation rk, are evaluated as authentic. It is readily verified that
the sum of all Uk does not change over time. We set the sum to be equal to fa-cl. The
sum of all Qk does not change with time as well. This sum is set to fcl. Finally, the
sum of all Rk is always equal to 1− fcl − fa-cl.
System (6.1) has equilibria similar to those of system (5.1).
Proposition 6.1. System (3.1) has equilibria at which RL = 1 − fcl − fa-cl − R0,
R0 ∈ [0, 1 − fcl − fa-cl], Q0 = fcl, U0 = fa-cl, and all the other phase variables are
equal to zero. At the equilibria pc = 1.
In accord with Table 3, and similar to the definition of e
(cl)
k , the probability that
an (anti-clique) document, submitted by a member of the anti-clique is evaluated as
authentic, is given by the formula
e
(a-cl)
k = γakpc(q¯, A) + (1− γak)pm(q¯, F ), k = 0, · · · , L. (6.2)
The probabilities of correct evaluation, pc, and false evaluation, pm, in (5.2),
(5.3), and (6.2) depend on the corresponding probabilities for individual evaluators (
cf.(2.4)). For example,
pc(g, A) = p
2
c,ind(g, A)(3− pc,ind(g, A)).
In accord with Table 4,
pc,ind(g, A) =
L∑
k=0
s
(reg)
k ck + 0.5
L∑
k=0
(s
(cl)
k + s
(a-cl)
k ),
pm,ind(g, F ) =
L∑
k=0
s
(reg)
k (1− ck) + 0.5
L∑
k=0
(s
(cl)
k + s
(a-cl)
k ),
pc,ind(q, A) =
L∑
k=0
s
(reg)
k ck +
L∑
k=0
s
(cl)
k ,
pm,ind(q, F ) =
L∑
k=0
s
(reg)
k (1− ck) +
L∑
k=0
s
(cl)
k ,
pc,ind(q¯, A) =
L∑
k=0
s
(reg)
k ck +
L∑
k=0
s
(a-cl)
k ,
pm,ind(q¯, F ) =
L∑
k=0
s
(reg)
k (1− ck) +
L∑
k=0
s
(a-cl)
k .
(6.3)
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Here, ck are defined as in (2.6).
The probability of selecting a regular member with a reputation rk is
s
(reg)
k =
rkRk∑L
i=0 ri(Ri +Qi + Ui)
, (6.4)
and, similarly, the probability of selecting a clique member with a reputation rk is
s
(cl)
k =
rkQk∑L
i=0 ri(Ri +Qi + Ui)
, (6.5)
and the probability of selecting an anti-clique member with a reputation rk
s
(a-cl)
k =
rkUk∑L
i=0 ri(Ri +Qi + Ui)
. (6.6)
The formula for pc is the same as in the case of one clique (5.8). However, some
of the terms change:
Prob(g, A) = (1− 2pλ)
L∑
k=0
Rkak,
P rob(g, F ) = (1− 2pλ)
L∑
k=0
Rk(1− ak),
P rob(q, A) = pλ
L∑
k=0
Rkak +
L∑
k=0
Qkγak,
P rob(q, F ) = pλ
L∑
k=0
Rk(1− ak) +
L∑
k=0
Qk(1− γak),
P rob(q¯, A) = pλ
L∑
k=0
Rkak +
L∑
k=0
Ukγak,
P rob(q¯, F ) = pλ
L∑
k=0
Rk(1− ak) +
L∑
k=0
Uk(1− γak).
(6.7)
In summary, the system with two antagonistic cliques has the following parame-
ters: the relative size of the first clique, fcl, the relative size of the antagonistic clique,
fa-cl, the proportion of documents matching the clique’s agenda, pλ, and the factor
γ, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, that decreases the probabilities of submitting authentic documents
by clique and anti-clique members. For simplicity in what follows it is assumed that
both cliques have the same size: fcl = fa-cl, fcl ≤ 0.5. When fcl = 0.5 there are no
regular members in the community, 1− 2fcl = 0.
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The first experiment was to explore whether the presence of an anti-clique im-
proves the quality of document evaluation. The experiment shows that the improve-
ment does take place but is not large. Figure 8 shows a typical behavior of the prob-
ability of correct document evaluation pc for various values of fcl and γ at t = 200
when the system is close to equilibrium. In the case, shown in the figure, L = 10,
α = σ = 0, at t = 0, R6 = 0.4, Q6 = 0.3, and U6 = 0.3 and all the other Rk, Qk, Uk
were equal to zero. Comparison with the behavior of the community with one clique
(Fig.6) shows that the region of the parameters fcl and γ, for which pc = 1, in the
case of two cliques is greater.
0
0.5
1 0
0.5
1
0
0.5
1
fcl ã
pc
A
B
Figure 8. Probability of correct document evaluation pc in a system
with two cliques for various values of the fraction of clique members
in the community, fcl, and the factor, decreasing the probability of
submitting authentic documents by clique members, γ. At t = 0, R6 =
0.4, Q6 = 0.3, and U6 = 0.3, while all the other components Rk, Qk,
and Uk are equal to zero. α = σ = 0. Details of the model behavior at
points A and B are described in the text.
In accord with Proposition 6.1, in the states with pc = 1, such as at point A of
Fig.8, we have R10 = 1− 2fcl, Q0 = fcl, U0 = fcl. The system pushes regular agents
into just two categories, with zero and 100% reputation. All clique members end up
with zero reputation.
When fcl = 0.3 and γ = 1 (Fig.8, point B) the evolution of the system is different.
In the corresponding steady state there are clique members with non-zero and even
100% reputation. These members can be selected to serve as evaluators. Because of
that there are many mistakes in document evaluation, pc ≈ 0.7.
7. Discussion
Most of the related work is done in the context of academic peer-reviewing and
e-commerce.
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Academic peer-review models are often considerably more complex compared to
the presented model which makes direct comparison with our model challenging. They
include academic-specific factors such as the resources available to researchers [12],
reputation of a journal [13], impact of rational referees, who might not have incentives
to see high quality publications other than their own [14], and so on. Nevertheless,
these studies have ideas that could be applied to the model considered. In particular
in [15], documents are evaluated by highly qualified ‘experts’, who make few mistakes,
and less qualified ‘readers’, who make more mistakes. It has been shown that the
evaluations by large numbers of readers (up to 100) have better accuracy compared to
the evaluations obtained by several experts. The presented model can be generalized
to include not three but any number of evaluators to exploit this mechanism.
Peer-to-peer interactions and associated reputation and trust models is a field
that has a lot of interest because of online commerce (e.g. eBay and Amazon)
[6,8,9,16–18], sharing economy (e.g. Uber, Lyft, AirBnB, Homeaway) [25], blockchain
networks [26], and sharing resources and information [7,19]. The computational mod-
els of reputation and trust vary in how individuals interact and use the results of in-
teractions. Most of this work is based on agent-based simulations. Theoretical results
are rare. Our approach is most closely related to EigenTrust reputation management
system in peer-to-peer networks [8]. In EigenTrust, peers accumulate global trust val-
ues from peer-to-peer interactions. Greater global trust values increase the chances of
peers to evaluate others. In our model, not individuals but subsets of members who
have the same value of reputation are considered. It makes the model more tractable
analytically and computationally.
Mathematically, our model belongs to the class of compartmental models (see re-
view [23]). Such models have been used in numerous contexts, from epidemiology [20]
to the transport of pollutants in ecosystems [24]. The system in [22] is particularly
related to the present study. It describes interactions between altruists and defec-
tors. As in the model considered here, the model in [22] has a continuum of stable
equilibrium states that are not asymptotically stable.
8. Conclusions and future work
We describe a model of a network community, in which fake and authentic docu-
ments, submitted by the community members, can be effectively evaluated by peers.
The mechanism of evaluation is based on the intuition that judgment should be dele-
gated to skilled and reputable evaluators. Similar mechanisms have been considered
earlier [8], but as far as we know not in population models. The population model
approach allowed us to explore possible dynamics of the community assuming large
number of its members. In traditional agent-based simulations the size of model
communities is limited.
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The proposed model is flexible and can be developed in multiple ways. Some
parameters should be refined on the basis of sociological studies. In particular here
we set the probability of submitting authentic documents, a(r), and the probability of
correct evaluation of documents, c(r), to be generic quadratic functions of the agent’s
reputation r. Further examination should determine for what values of the parameters
α and σ, functions a(r) and c(r) approximate data in the best way. Second, it could
be that some clique members are not totally preoccupied with the clique agenda,
as assumed in the present model, but also submit and correctly evaluate generic
documents. To what extent would this impact the model?
Other parameters of the model can be chosen by developers of the system. The
presented results show that within a certain range of such parameters the model
has the desired behavior. Future theoretical analyses, including global sensitivity
analysis [27], may improve such choices. Analyses may show that performance of
the model gets better if more than three evaluators evaluate every document, reveal
the optimal number and distribution of reputation levels (potentially considering
continuous distribution of reputations and partial differential equations), determine
that the system functions better if earning reputation is harder than losing it, etc.
In the present study we model a closed system; similar systems are often con-
sidered in chemical kinetics. Adding new community members with certain rate will
transform the system into an open system. It would be interesting to explore the
changes of the mathematical properties of the system under this transformation.
Can a community modeled in the present study function in the real world? It
depends on the extent to which the model assumptions are correct. Two assumptions
can be met relatively easy. One is that all the documents are verifiable. For example,
if the description says that the photo depicts an event happening at some place
at some time then the image should have the corresponding EXIF-encoded GPS
coordinates and time. GPS-connected smartphones and cameras get this information
automatically. In a real-world community, an authentic document is also expected to
be novel and not a copy or a slightly changed version of an already posted document.
Current technologies allow to meet these requirements as well.
The second assumption is that the community members, selected to serve as
evaluators, should really do it and do it quickly. This is a matter of the community
discipline. Many journals demonstrate such a discipline is possible to maintain.
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